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THE ANONYMOUS ACCUSED:
PROTECTING DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
IN HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
Abstract: The public's interest in high-profile crimes and the media's
coverage of high-profile trials have significantly increased over the past.
fifty years, raising significant concerns about a high-profile defendant's
right to a fair trial. This Note examines how pretrial publicity can affect
the fairness of a high-profile criminal case and how courts have
attempted to protect a high-profile defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a fair trial while still assuring the media's First Amendment right to
freedom of the press. Specifically, the Note discusses and analyzes court
made remedies as well as new remedies scholars have proposed to
protect a high-profile criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. Finding
such remedies ineffective, the Note considers whether defendant
anonymity, which courts can apply in civil trials, could be an effective
protection of a high-profile defendant's right to a fair trial.
INTRODUCTION
In 1941, in Bridges v. California, United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice Hugo Black stated, "Legal trials are not like elections, to be won
through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper." 1
In the last decade, it seems as though Justice Black's fear that legal
battles would be waged in the media has come to fruition. 2 The pub-
lic's interest in high-profile criminal cases has grown dramatically over
the last decade, increasing the difficulty of finding impartial deci-
sionmakers. 3 Because such a highly publicized atmosphere surrounds
potential jurors, these triers of fact may be influenced as to the guilt.
or innocence of a high-profile defendant before the trial even begins. 4
Without question, high-profile criminal cases receive a great
amount of attention from the media. 5 Over the past ten years, the
media has brought many cases into our living rooms through exten-
314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941).
2 See id.
3 See Laurie Nicole Robinson, Note, Professional Athletes—Held to a Higher Standard and
Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and the Need for States to Establish
High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. U. 1313, 1313 (1998).
4 Id.
3 See id.
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sive television and print coverage of high-profile criminal trials.°
There are basically three types of high-profile cases: (1) cases with
sexual or sordid facts that appeal to people's voyeuristic tendencies,
even though the murderer or victims are most likely non-celebrities;?
(2) cases in which the crime is particularly heinous; 8 and (3) cases in
which the defendants are national celebrities or otherwise well-known
throughout their local area, but the crime itself is not sordid or hei-
nous enough to draw the attention of the media without the celebrity
status of the defendant. 9
 In each of these types of cases, a trial judge
has the obligation to assure that the defendants receive a fair trial in
which an impartial jury determines their guilt or innocence. 10
Depending on the story the media relays to the public, the in-
tense media coverage surrounding high-profile criminal cases can ei-
ther destroy a defendant's chances for a fair trial'' or ultimately bene-
fit the defendant. 12
 Pretrial publicity work against a high-profile
defendant because the media coverage can often negatively preju-
6 See hi.
7 See PETER E. KANE, MURDER, COURTS, AND Tim PRESS: ISSUES IN FREE PRESS/FAIR
TRIAL 63 (1986); Robinson, supra note 3, at 1313 (stating high-profile cases include the
Amy Fisher case, the Lorena Bobbit case, and the Tonya Harding case).
8 See KANE, supra note 7, at 63. The Manson Family murders and the Rodney King
beating are classic examples of cases that are high profile due to the bizarre or disturbing
nature of the facts surrounding the case.
9 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1313; sce KANE, supra note 7, at 63. Examples of this type of
case include the following celebrity defendants: Sam Sheppard (he was a prominent local
doctor); Mike Tyson; Robert Downey, Jr.; Jayson Williams; Sean "P. Diddy" Combs; and
Snoop Dogg. Some cases, such as the O.J. Simpson case, have both heinous or sordid fact
patterns and a well-known defendant. Thus, the lines between the three types of high-
profile criminal cases are not always distinct. See KANE, supra note 7, at 63.
18 KANE, supra note 7, at 63.
" See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1327. For example, the United States Supreme Court
was both shocked and outraged by the inherent unfairness of Sam Sheppard's murder trial
caused by extensive media coverage surrounding the case. Sec Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333, 355 (1966). The "media circus" surrounding the trial ultimately resulted in Dr.
Sheppard's first-degree murder conviction. See id.
IS See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1330 ("MI is important to remember that, at least for
[CIJ.1 Simpson, the pretrial publicity ultimately inured to his benefit, as the jury acquitted
him on both murder counts."). Another such criminal defendant that seems to have bene-
fited not only from the intense media coverage surrounding his case but also from his
celebrity status is Sean "P. Diddy" Combs. Sec Marcus Errico, Puffy Not Guilty!, E! Online
News (Mar. 16, 2001), at http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,7973,00.html . In 2001,
a jury found Bad Boy records mogul Sean Combs not guilty of four counts of criminal gun
possession and one count of bribing a witness despite a plethora of seemingly incriminat-
ing evidence presented against him over the course of a seven-week trial. Id.
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dices the potential pool of jurors against a defendant." Because pre-
trial publicity can have disastrous effects on the fairness of high-
profile criminal cases, courts have struggled over the past fifty years to
fashion remedies that. protect defendants in high-profile cases from
being prematurely convicted by a jury due to negative media cover-
age. l 4
To make it more likely that an impartial jury will try a defendant,
courts are armed with an arsenal of devices designed to minimize the
prejudicial effects caused by excessive media coverage in a high-
profile case." These devices include: gag orders on trial participants,
prior restraints on the media, voir dire, special jury instructions, se-
questration, postponement, and change of venue. 16 Although courts
still employ these techniques, in many cases, the use of one or more
of them has not proven sufficient to protect an accused's right. to a
fair trial. 17
This Note proposes a new solution to the problem of protecting
the high-profile criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial in a media-dominated atmosphere." In civil trials, courts may
keep a plaintiff's identity anonymous throughout the trial even
though the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require plaintiffs to dis-
close their names in the instrument they file to commence a lawsuit."
Courts will allow plaintiffs to depart from this "procedural custom
fraught with constitutional overtones" to accommodate a plaintiff's
asserted need to proceed anonymously through the use of a fictitious
name. 20 This Note argues that allowing a high-profile criminal defen-
" Set Robinson, supra note 3, at 1325. This Note acknowledges that pretrial publicity
can also benefit a high-profile criminal defendant during a trial. Sec id. Nevertheless, this
Note focuses only on how pretrial media coverage negatively impacts a defendant's right to
a fair trial. Sec infra notes 29–•3 and accompanying text. Moreover, this Note recognizes
that anonymity could help the prosecution in cases where the defendant could use his
celebrity status to get special treatment from the jury. See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1325.
" See Charles H. Whitebread & Darrell W. Contreras. Free Press v. Fair Trial: Protecting
the Criminal Defendant's Rights in a Highly Publicized Trial by Applying the Sheppard-Mu'Min
Remedy, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1587, 1588 (1996).
15 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1334.
18 Id.
17 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
on the "Free Press—Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 413 (1968), revised by 87 F.R.D. 519
(1980),
IS See infra notes 301-368 and accompanying text.
1° FED. R. CIV, P. 10(a).
2° Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981); scc Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for
Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 684-85 (11th Cir. 2001); S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women
Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1979).
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dant to proceed anonymously can safeguard a the defendant's right to
a fair trial both by shielding potential jurors from prejudicial pretrial
publicity about the particular defendant and by preventing any juror
exposure to pretrial publicity from biasing his or her decision-making
ability during the tria1. 21
Section I of this Note explores remedies trial courts use to mini-
mize the prejudicial impacts of pretrial publicity on a high-profile de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. 22
 Section II discusses new remedies
scholars have proposed as possible solutions to the problem of exten-
sive pretrial publicity in high-profile criminal cases.23 This section ex-
plains how the proposed solutions would operate. 24
 Section III focuses
on party anonymity in civil trials and what factors courts look at to de-
cide if a case is one in which party anonymity is necessary. 26 Section IV
explains the ineffectiveness of the remedies courts currently utilize to
protect a high-profile defendant's rights in a media-dominated at-
mosphere. 26
 Section V analyzes the effectiveness of new solutions
scholars have proposed to remedy the problem of pretrial publicity in
high-profile criminal cases. 27
 Finally, Section VI argues by analogy that
party anonymity; as it is used in civil trials, would effectively protect a
high-profile criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial despite any pretrial publicity that might have occurred. 28
CURRENT REMEDIES COURTS USE IN HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
When fashioning a remedy to protect a high-profile defendant's
right to a fair trial, a trial judge must balance the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial with the media's First Amendment
right to freedom of the press. 28
 Indeed, a high-profile defendant's
21 See infra notes 301-368 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 29-122 and accompanying text.
25
 See infra notes 123-180 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 123-180 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 181-210 and accompanying text.
25 See info notes 211-278 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 279-300 and accompanying text.
2s See infra notes 301-368 and accompanying text.
29 See Robert S. Stephen, Prejudicial Publicity Surrounding a Criminal Trial: What a Trial
Court Can Do To Ensure a Fair Trial in the Face of a "Media Circus," 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1063, 1063 (1992); Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1588. The First Amendment
of the United States Constitution states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Sixth Amendment
provides:
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Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial often conflicts with the media's
First Amendment right of freedom of the press. 3° Trial by an unbiased
jury is one of the rights the Sixth Amendment guarantees defen-
dants," Chief justice John Marshall wrote, "[T]lie great value of the
trial by jury certainly consists in its fairness and impartiality. Those
who most prize the institution, prize it because it furnishes a tribunal
which may be expected to be uninfluenced by an undue bias of
mind."32 In both state and federal courts, permitting a biased jury to
decide a criminal defendant's fate fundamentally denies the defen-
dant of due process of law."
A jury of one's peers has long been recognized as key to protect-
ing defendants from arbitrary state action." Defining what constitutes
an impartial jury, however, has plagued courts for quite some time."
The presence of the mass media has only intensified the problem."
One commentator notes, "fAls criminal procedure and the rules of
evidence became more formalized, it became important to find jurors
sufficiently unbiased and removed from the facts to decide the case
based solely on the evidence presented in court, and not by extra-
judicial knowledge."37 Indeed, extensive pretrial publicity makes it
very difficult to find jurors who are impartial enough not to decide
the case based on information obtained outside the courtroom."
Chief Justice Marshall explains:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1588.
Sl MATEIIEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND 'EDE MEDIA: RECONCILING FAIR TRIALS AND A
FREE PRESS 41 (1997).
"United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cm. 49, 50 (Va, Cir. Ct, 1807) (No. 14,692).
99 BUNKER, SUM note 31, at 41.
34 Id. ("The presence of jurors precluded secret trials, secured the citizenry from venal
judges, purchased testimony, or threatening officials, and protected them from other
abuses by governments unconcerned with the liberties of its people."); sec DAVID J. Bo-
DENIIAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN firsTuitv 32 (1992).
99 BUNKER, supra note 31, at 41.
" Id.
97 Id.
la See id.
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Such a person [a juror possessing a fixed opinion about the
guilt of the accused] may believe that he will be regulated by
testimony, but the law suspects him, and certainly not with-
out reason. He will listen with more favor to that testimony
which confirms, than to that which will change his opinion;
it is not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argu-
ment as fairly as a man whose judgment is not made up in
the case."
Because high-profile cases generate such extensive pretrial publicity,
judges must employ certain devices that make it more likely that the
impaneled jury is an impartial one. 40
High-profile criminal cases receive national media attention dur-
ing the investigatory and pretrial proceeding and typically involve the
following types of cases: those that involve sordid facts but lack a ce-
lebrity defendant or victim; those in which the nature of the crime is
heinous; and those that involve a famous defendant or victim:" The
national media coverage each of these types of cases receives increases
the difficulty of finding impartial decisionmakers. 42 Thus, courts have
employed the remedies described below to decrease the negative ef-
fects pretrial publicity has on the fairness of high-profile criminal
cases. 43
A. Gag Orders on. Trial Participants
A court may employ a gag order to restrain trial participants from
making extrajudicial statements when there is a reasonable likelihood
that prejudicial publicity may prevent a fair trial." By issuing a gag
" Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 50.
40 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1334.
41
 Id. at 1313.
42 Id.
43 See id. at 1334.
44 See Stephen, supra note 29, at 1084. In the federal corruption case against Provi-
dence Mayor Vincent A. Cialld Jr., United States District Court Judge Ernest C. Torres
issued a gag order prohibiting the defendants, their lawyers, prosecutors, witnesses, poten-
tial witnesses, law-enforcement officials involved in the investigation, and court personnel
from releasing information outside that in the public record. Tracy Breton. Operation Pilffi-
der Dome: Judge Acts to Silence All Talk in Case, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL„ May 16, 2001, at 1A. The
judge put the gag order into effect until the final verdicts were entered; people caught
violating the order would be held in contempt of court. Id. Judge Torres said that the pur-
pose of the gag order was "to protect the rights of both the defendants and the United
States to a fair trial before an impartial jury by prohibiting the kinds of extrajudicial state-
ments and disclosures that, if widely disseminated, would be likely to threaten those rights
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order, a trial court may prohibit lawyers, witnesses, jurors, court per-
sonnel, and others directly involved with the trial from making any
harmful extrajudicial statements outside the courtroom setting. 45 In
1966, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the trial court should have proscribed extrajudicial statements by
trial participants due to the intense media scrutiny surrounding the
case, 46
 There, Dr. Sam Sheppard, accused of murdering his pregnant
wife, was subject to extensive media scrutiny from the beginning of
(he ordea1. 47 First, the media reported Sheppard's refusal to take a lie
detector test. 48
 In addition, the local coroner questioned Sheppard in
the presence of television, radio, and newspaper reporters, as well as
several hundred spectators. 49 Moreover, the police arrested Sheppard
and charged him with murder just hours after a front-page editorial
appeared asking, "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in jail?"50
 This intense
media scrutiny continued throughout the trial, exposing potential
jurors to the coverage. 51 The Court held that the trial court's failure
to protect Sheppard from the prejudicial publicity denied him his
right to a fair trial in violation of due process." Furthermore, the
Court asserted that the trial court should have controlled the release
of information to the media." The Court stated that it would permit a
trial judge to issue a gag order to prevent trial participants from frus-
trating the proper functioning of court proceedings in circumstances
and the integrity of the trial process." Id. He further stated that: "The need for this order
arises from the intensive media coverage of this case.... There have been a number of
widely publicized disclosures and statements by individuals involved in this case which, if
allowed to continue, would create a substantial risk of prejudicing the parties' right to a
fair trial." Id.
" See id.
45 See 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966).
47 Sec id. at 338-39; Stephen, supra note 29, at 107.1.
48
 Sec Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 339.
49 See id. When Sheppard's counsel tried to participate in this questioning, which was
broadcast live, he was forcibly ejected by the coroner, who received cheers from the crowd.
Id. at 340.
50 Sec Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 341.
51 See id. at 345. When jurors viewed the murder scene, they were accompanied by
hundreds of reporter, onlookers, and a helicopter from which reporters took pictures.
Stephen, supra note 29, at 1072-73. During sequestered deliberations, photographers took
pictures of jurors for a local newspaper. Id. at 1073. Sheppard was subsequently convicted
of second-degree murder. Id.
52 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 335.
" See id. at 361-62.
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where pretrial publicity would threaten a defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial. 54
B. Prio• Restraints on the Media
A similar, yet more drastic, device available to courts is a prior
restraint, which prohibits the media from publishing any information
that threatens the defendant's right to a fair trial." Although arguably
the most powerful device in preventing the rapid spread of prejudicial
publicity, such orders come with a high presumption of invalidity tin-
der the First Amendment and therefore remain highly ineffective."
The United States Supreme Court has stated clearly that prior re-
straints are not permissible in open trial proceedings.57
In 1976, in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, the United States Su-
preme Court set out a three-part balancing test for a trial court to use
in analyzing the constitutionality of allowing a prior restraint in a
criminal trial." In determining whether prior restraints are a viable
option, courts must consider the following: (1) "the nature and extent
of pretrial news coverage;" (2) "whether other measures would likely
mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity;" and (3) "how
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threat-
ened danger."59
 Trial courts may not utilize prior restraints to protect
a defendant's rights if other, less restrictive alternatives are available. 60
In Nebraska Press, the defendant was accused of killing almost the
entire Kellie family, including the grandfather, the grandmother, their
son, and three minor grandchildren. 61 Once news media received
word of the crime, a local radio station immediately broadcasted a
police bulletin warning of an armed sniper in the area. 62 The news
media urged everyone to stay indoors, and several businesses shut
down.65
 By the next clay, news of the crime had spread all over town.64
The police found the defendant lurking behind the Kellie residence
54 See id. at 361.
55 Sec Stephen, supra note 29, at 1083.
56 See id.
"Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1590.
" See 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
59 Id.
6° See id. at 565.
5I KANE, supra note 7, at 33.
62 Id.
°6 Id.
54 Id.
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the day after the murders; the court arraigned him that day.° The day
after his arraignment, the story of the murders and the defendant's
arrest for the crime dominated the news on the radio, television, and
in the print media.° The press revealed that the defendant had ad-
mitted the murder to his parents and confessed to the murders to the
police.° Widespread public speculation regarding the motive for the
crime and the defendant's mental state filled the small community."
In the factual circumstances outlined above, the Nebraska Press
Court did not uphold the prior restraint ordered by the trial judge. 69
The Court did find that the trial judge was 'justified in concluding
that there would be intense and pervasive pretrial publicity" and was
acting reasonably to believe "that publicity might impair the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial."70 Nevertheless, the Court did not uphold
the prior restraint because the trial judge did not consider other al-
ternatives less threatening to First Amendment rights." The Court
also did not allow the prior restraint because the defense did not
meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that, without prior re-
straints, the defendant would not receive a fair tria1. 72 For the major-
ity, Chief Justice Warren Burger asserted, "It is not clear that further
publicity, unchecked, would so distort the views of potential jurors
that ... [they could not render] a just verdict exclusively on the evi-
dence presented in open court." 73 Because of the tight restrictions on
the use of prior restraints, their use as a remedy to prejudicial pretrial
publicity is severely constrained:74
Earlier cases dealing with prior restraints on the media were lim-
ited to print and press media. 75
 In recent years, however, trial cover-
age has expanded to include television coverage of high-profile
criminal trials. 76 The United States Supreme Court has not directly
determined whether banning television cameras in the courtroom is
an unconstitutional prior restraint." In 1981, in Chandler v. Florida,
82 Id.
68 KANE, supra note 7, at 34.
67 Id.
68 Id.
88 See 427 U.S. at 613.
70 Id. at 562-63.
71 See id. at 565.
72
 Id. at 569.
73 Id.
74 See Neb. Pros, 427 U.S. at 569.
75 Whitebread & Contreras. supra note 14, at 1594.
76 See id.
77 Sec id.
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the United States Supreme Court held that states are free to permit
electronic media to cover a trial and doing so does not, by itself, deny
a defendant's right to a fair tria1. 78 An exception to this rule states,
however, that if a defendant can show that "media coverage of his
case—be it printed or broadcast—compromised the ability of the par-
ticular jury that heard the case to adjudicate fairly," 79 then the trial
judge may remove the television cameras.8° To date, states have the
authority to determine whether to permit television coverage in the
courtroom; however, television coverage is not typically allowed in
federal courtrooms. 81
C. Voir Dire
Another remedy courts may fashion to effectively balance the in-
terests of high-profile defendants and the media is voir dire. 82 Appel-
late courts often give great weight to thorough voir dire procedures
conducted by trial courts. 83
 Voir dire typically involves the routine
questioning of potential jurors to gauge their competence and poten-
tial bias. 84 Voir dire questioning includes inquiries about a potential
juror's occupation, family, education, prior convictions, and knowl-
edge of the trials-5
 Because the voir dire process involves an examina-
tion designed to determine the extent of jurors' knowledge and
prejudices about the case, a trial court can detect any potential juror
bias before the trial to secure an impartial jury. 88
In 1991, in MuMin v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court
established the current standard for detecting potential juror bias
through voir dire. 87
 For inquiries about the amount and content of
76 See 449 U.S. 560, 566-83 (1981); Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1595.
19 Chandler. 449 U.S. at 575.
a° See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1595.
81 See id.
Sec Stephen, supra note 29. at 1087.
83 Id.
84 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1600.
85 Id.
88 KANE, supra note 7, at 65.
87 See 500 U.S. 415, 419-21, 431-32 (1991). 141117tlin involved a prisoner who murdered
a storeowner during a prison furlough program. Id. The case received extensive prejudicial
pretrial publicity. Id. Prior to the trial, the press reported the defendant's juvenile record,
parole rejections, and defendant's suspected involvement in a prison beating. Id. The press
often referred to defendant as a "convicted murderer," lustful," and not a model pris-
oner." Id. The defendant was convicted of murder. Id. He appealed his conviction, alleging
that his right to an impartial jury had been violated because eight of the twelve jurors ad-
mitted to having read or heard reports about the case prior to the trial. Id.
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juror exposure to pretrial publicity to be considered a constitutional
requirement under the Sixth Amendment, a high-profile criminal de-
fendant. must show that a lack of such questioning would make the
trial fundamentally unfair. 88 The Court also stated that a trial judge
could sufficiently protect a high-profile defendant's rights by asking
potential jurors whether they have formed opinions contradicting the
pretrial publicity. 89 Unless the adverse publicity and media attention
justify a presumption of prejudice, a court should believe a potential
juror's statements about his or her possible biases." In sum, a defen-
dant's questioning of a potential juror about the extent of his or her
knowledge of the case is an entitlement to know whether a juror,
based on his or her own assessment, can remain impartial despite
previously obtained information. 91
D. Jury Instructions
Courts can also give special jury instructions to decrease the
prejudicial effects of excessive media coverage on a trial. 92 In high-
profile trials, judges often emphasize the jurors' duty to remain im-
partial during instructions to the jury concerning the law and facts of
the case." At times, jury instructions can correct for prejudicial in-
formation potential jurors receive prior to sequestration. 94 In 1972, in
People v. Shim, the Supreme Court of California reviewed the defen-
dant's claim that he was denied his right to an impartial jury, which
he based on the fact that after jury selection but before sequestration,
the Los Angeles Times reported a severely prejudicial leak about the
defendant's intentions to accept a plea bargain to avoid the death
penalty." The trial judge questioned the impaneled jurors about their
knowledge of the plea bargain and admonished them to make a deci-
" See id. at 430-31.
99 See id.
" See id.
31 See id.
311 See Munn, 500 U.S. at 430-31.
93 Sec Stephen, supra note 29, at 1090. In 1955, in Bianchi v. United States, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction where trial
court carefully instructed the jury to remain impartial during their deliberations. See 219
F.2d 182, 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1955).
94 Stephen, supra note 29, at 1090.
33 See 497 P.2d 1121, 1133 (Cal. 1972), overruled fry Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d
916 (Cal. 1978), superseded by statute as stated in Noll ins v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 697
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990);,1. EDWARD GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT
80 (1988).
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sion based on knowledge gained from the courtroom and not the
press.9° Indeed, this admonition is what ultimately saved the plea bar-
gain and avoided a mistrial. 97
 In instances such as these, jury instruc-
tions can be crucial in maintaining the fairness of proceedings and in
preventing the possibility of a mistrial if the media reports prejudicial
information prior to jury sequestration. 98 Due to the nominal cost in-
volved with jury instructions, they are useful in certain situations. 99
E. Sequestration
Jury sequestration is another device available to courts to protect
a defendant's right to a fair tria1. 100
 By restricting the jury's access to
extrajudicial information, a court tries to ensure that jurors will reach
a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at tria1. 101 In 1966, in
Sheppard, the United States Supreme Court criticized the trial judge
for not taking appropriate steps to protect the high-profile defen-
dant's right to a fair tria1. 102
 The Court suggested that the judge
should have sequestered the jury to keep media publicity about the
trial from reaching the Unpaneled jurors. 1 °3
In 1976, in the People v. Manson (the Tate-LaBianca murder case),
the California Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's decision to
sequester the jury, which turned out to be a key move in ensuring the
jurors' impartiality. 104
 As a result of the sequestration, the jurors were
protected from both the extensive procedural arguments in court that
might have influenced their attitudes toward the defendants and the
widespread extrajudicial discussion of the case by the trial participants
during the proceedings. 1 °5
 One commentator notes, "This [extrajudi-
cial] discussion and the wide coverage of the trial continued to rein-
force the public views of the predetermined guilt of the defen-
" See Sirhan, 497 P.2d at 1133 n.7.
97 See id. at 1133.
" See GERALD, supra note 95, at 81; Stephen, supra note 29, at 1090.
99
 Sec Stephen, supra note 29, at 1090.
100 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1604.
101 Id.
192 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361-62; Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1604.
10
 See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363; Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1604. For
example, in 1979, in Khaalis a. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
commended the trial court for minimizing the effect of publicity by immediately seques-
tering the jury. 408 A.2d 313, 335 (D.C. 1979).
101
	 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); KANE, supra note 7, at 29.
105 See Manson, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 319; KANE, supra note 7, at 29.
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clan ts."I°6 Despite the benefits of sequestration, it is only a viable op-
tion in cases in which the potential for prejudicing a defendant's right
to a fair trial outweighs the exorbitant financial and social costs often
associated with sequestration. 07 To avoid imposing unnecessary bur-
dens on both taxpayers and jurors, a rational court would implement
sequestration as a remedy only if the benefits to the defendant of hav-
ing a sequestered jury outweighed any potential costs. 108
F. Postponement
In Sheppard, the United States Supreme Court stated that post-
ponement is an action that a trial judge can take to guarantee an im-
partial jury because it delays the trial until the threat of prejudicial
pretrial publicity abates or dies out. 109 The assumption behind post-
ponement is that public attention surrounding a case will actually
fade over time."° Moreover, trial courts assume that the lapse of time
between the appearance of prejudicial news and the trial not only will
diminish potential jurors' ability to remember details of a case heard
before the trial but also will allow jurors to set aside biases formed be-
fore the beginning of the trial."
G. Change of Venue
Trial courts can grant a change of venue to another locale where
the publicity surrounding a case is not as widespread,] l2 Moving a trial
from a locale where the publicity is widespread to a region where pub-
licity is not as extensive results in finding a pool of potential jurors
106 KANE, supra note 7, at 29. Kane states that one example of the media publicity that
continued during the Manson trial includes the prospective prosecution witness Virginia
Graham. Id. Her testimony was particularly damaging to the defense. Id. All the lawyers
were given a transcript of Graham's intended testimony and were instructed by the judge
not to reveal the contents of it to the media. Id. The full story of the testimony promptly
appeared in the Los Angeles Hemid-Exami no; which received the transcript from a mem-
ber of the defense team. Id. Had the jury not been sequestered, it would have had the
opportunity to read the testimony before it was offered in court. Sec id. at 29-30.
107 See \Thitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1604. The jury in the Manson mur-
der trial was sequestered for a little over eight months with a total cost of $768,838. Id. The
Manson trial began in June 1970 and ended in January 1971. Id. The O.J. Simpson jurors
were sequestered for 266 days for a total cost of $2,985,052. Id. at 1612.
108 See id.
00 384 U.S. at 363: DOUGLAS S. CAMPBELL, FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL: SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS SINCE 1807, at 132 (1994).
110 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1618-19.
HI GERALD, supra note 95, at 77.
See Stephen. supra note 29, at 1085-86.
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who have not had much exposure to pretrial media coverage and who
have the ability to render a fair and impartial verdict." 5
In 1961, in Irvin v. Dowd, the United States Supreme Court, for
the very first time, overturned a conviction based solely on pretrial
publicity.'" There, an Indiana trial court granted defendant's motion
to change the venue to an adjoining county in order to find jurors
who had not been exposed to media reports about the case.'" In
/ruin, intense media coverage surrounded six murders committed in a
rural community.'" After the police arrested the defendant, the
prosecutor issued press releases stating that Irvin had confessed to all
of the murders as well as twenty-four burglaries. 117
 Before the defen-
dant's trial, newspapers reaching almost all of the residences in the
court's county published numerous articles about the case; moreover,
local radio and television stations also covered the case extensively.'"
The publicity included information about the defendant's criminal
history and murder confessions. 119
 Even with the .
 venue change, al-
most ninety percent of the prospective jurors questioned during voir
dire had formed some opinion as to the defendant's guilt before the
trial even began. 12° Because the pretrial publicity was so extensive and
widespread, the Court in Irvin found the trial flawed despite the
change in venue."' Thus, in high-profile cases where media involve-
ment is overly excessive, a venue change will not always produce a jury
entirely unaware of the issues surrounding the case. 122
II. NEW PROPOSALS BY SCHOLARS TO PROTECT A HIGH-PROFILE
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL FROM
THE DANGERS OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
As discussed in Section I, courts have the option of employing
several devices to prevent pretrial publicity from interfering with a
defendant's right to a fair tria1. 123
 Because these devices have proven
unsuccessful in certain instances, scholars have attempted to craft so-
1 " Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1604.
114 See 366 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1961).
115 Sec id. at 720.
118 See id.
117 See id. at 719-20.
118 See id. at 725.
119 Sec Irvin, 366 U.S. at 725.
12° See id. at 727.
121 See id. at 728.
122 See id. at 727-28.
125 Sec supra notes 44-122 and accompanying text.
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lutions that would more effectively protect a high-profile defendant's
rights to a fair trial. 124 Although alternatives have been suggested, it is
uncertain whether they can address effectively the fairness concerns
at issue in high-profile cases. 125
A. The Establishment of High-Profile Courts
Because the arsenal of techniques described above are ineffective
when applied in high-profile cases, Laurie Nicole Robinson proposes
a solution that she believes would help "balance the scales of justice
for high-profile defendants."126 This solution involves the establish-
ment of special high-profile courts to hear only high-profile cases. 127 A
high-profile criminal court would essentially take high-profile crimi-
nal cases out of the hands of potentially biased jurors and place them
into the hands of judges specially trained to deal with high-profile
cases. 128
Robinson asserts that judges selected to preside over high-profile
criminal cases should be not only neutral and experienced, but also
specially trained. 123 To guarantee high-quality judges, Robinson pro-
poses that state bar associations, which are more familiar with judges'
past performance and experience, nominate judges to serve on high-
profile courts.'" Robinson contends that because judges who serve on
a high-profile court may be scrutinized or swayed by the media and
public opinion, those judges should be appointed for life."' Judges
considered for a high-profile court should have a minimum of five
years' experience in the area of criminal law by serving as a prosecu-
tor, criminal defense lawyer, or judge." 2 Candidates for a high-profile
court. should also have previous experience adjudicating high-profile
cases."3 Robinson's goal in requiring high-profile judges to have ex-
perience in these cases is to ensure that those judges can maintain
124 See infra notes 126-180 and accompanying text.
129 See infra notes 279-300 and accompanying text.
126 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1339. Robinson drafted this note while a student at Indi-
ana University School of Law—Bloomington. Upon graduation, Robinson became an as-
sociate in the New York office of Epstein, Becker & Green.
127 id.
1213
129 See id. The foundation of the high-profile court rests on the use of "specially trained
high-profile judges." Id.
130 See id. at 1340.
191 Sec Robinson, nip/ note 3, at 1340-41.
m Id. at 1341.
189 Id.
916	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 44:901
control in the courtroom in the face of the media. 134 Also, this may
decrease the likelihood that those judges will be influenced by media
scrutiny, public opinion, or the defendant's celebrity stants. 155
Top officials of the state court system would be responsible for
selecting the judge that would adjudicate a particular high-profile
case.' 56
 In making this decision, the officials must determine that the
selected judge has no potential conflicts. 137
 Furthermore, high-profile
judges must not be influenced by pretrial publicity; the officials of the
state court system would make certain of this by interviewing judges
one-on-one or forcing judges to complete questionnaires." 8
Robinson also recommends that all high-profile judges partici-
pate in a training program geared solely toward the practice of adju-
dicating high-profile cases. 139 First, judges should receive training in
trial procedure; this would require participation in a series of mock
trials."° These mock trials would be designed to address issues such as
determining witness credibility, asking questions to develop facts, and
resolving conflicts in evidence.t"t Second, Robinson recommends that
high-profile judges receive training in the area of media manage-
ment. 142
 This training would encompass, among other things, meth-
ods that would enhance judges' ability to communicate with the me-
dia."3
 Because high-profile judges will have to sentence convicted
high-profile defendants, Robinson thirdly suggests that judges receive
training on uniformity in sentencing to ensure the consistency of
punishment in high-profile cases with that of similar non-high-profile
• criminal adjudications."'
Robinson further contends that a defendant's entitlement to a
jury trial should be eliminated in high-profile cases involving petty
offenses."5
 Instead, a high-profile defendant would have his or her
134
 See id.
136 Id.
136
 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1342.
137 Id. Robinson demonstrates this proposal with the following example:
	 a certain
singer elects to have her case heard by a high-profile judge and the defendant is the
judge's favorite musician, the state would be responsible for concluding that the judge has
the potential for bias in that case." Id.
"8 Id.
"9 Id. at 1343.
140 Id.
141 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1343.
142 Id.
' 4 ' Id.
144 Id. at 1344.
145 See id. at 1344-45.
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case heard by a specially trained high-profile judge. 146
 Robinson sug-
gests that a judge would have the ability to adjudicate the case more
fairly than a jury because the status of the defendant likely would have
less influence on a judge.' 47
 This proposal is constitutionally feasible
because the United States Supreme Court has held that crimes cate-
gorized as "petty offenses" do not implicate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. 148
Robinson also strongly recommends that when high-profile de-
fendants are charged with more serious offenses, they should be given
a unilateral right to have their cases heard by a high-profile judge) 49
This right is necessary because, clue to pretrial publicity and excessive
media coverage during the trial, high-profile defendants are some-
times held to a higher standard in the criminal justice system.'"
Moreover, high-profile cases tend to reverse the roles of the defense
and prosecution because the pretrial publicity tends to benefit the
prosecution more than the defense)" In such cases, the defendant is
normally forced to prove his or her innocence, rather than the prose-
cution having to prove the defendant's guilt, because jurors often
predetermine a defendant's guilt before the trial) 52 Because the de-
fendant. in a high-profile case will most likely face a biased jury clue to
extensive pretrial publicity, the defendant should have the right to
have his or her case decided by a neutral factfinder so that lie or she
can obtain a fair trial. 15
B. The Sheppard-MteMin Remedy
Charles H. Whitebread and Darrell W. Contreras, Professors of
Law at the University of Southern California Law School, believe that
the best solution to effectively eliminate pretrial prejudice in high-
146 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1344.
/47 Id.
148 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,159 (1968).
149 See Robinson, suprir. note 3, at 1347.
1" See id. at 1327-28. Robinson explains that high-profile criminal defendants are of-
ten held to a higher standard in the criminal justice system because their celebrity status
can often subject them to aggressive prosecution. Id. Also, when the high-profile defen-
dant is a professional athlete, fame, fortune, and celebrity status impose a heavy burden on
athletes to conform to the public's image of "flawless human beings." Id. at 1328. Because
athletes. hi addition to other sorts of celebrities, are considered to be role models for
youths, they are sometimes held to a higher standard. Id. at 1327-28.
151 Id. at 1348.
152 sec Id .
155 See id. at 1349.
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profile cases is the so-called Sheppard-Mu Min remedy because it
"strikes the proper balance between the defendant's interest in a fair
trial and the media's interest in informing the public: 454 Using the
Sheppard-MuMin remedy, trial courts impose a gag order on trial par-
ticipants as soon as the trial proceedings commence and fashion voir
dire according to the standard enumerated in Mu Min v. Virginia. 155
1. Gag Orders on Trial Participants
The first part of the proposed Sheppard.-Mu Mitt remedy involves
imposing a gag order on trial participants) 56
 Whitebread and Con-
treras assert that, in high-profile criminal cases, both sides have an
incentive to address the public via the media and circulate informa-
tion that will result in a court. victory. 157 Due to these interests, a trial
court should impose a gag order restricting the communications of
the trial participants immediately after proceedings commence. 155 In
effect, this gag order would forbid all parties involved in the case from
164
	 & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1620. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the United
States Supreme Court held that Sheppard was denied his right to a fair trial because of the
trial judge's failure to protect him from prejudicial pretrial publicity. Charles H. White-
bread, Selecting Juries in High Profile Criminal Cases, 2 GREEN BAG 2v 191,197 (1999); see 384
U.S. 333,361-63 (1966). The Court said that the trial judge could have mitigated pretrial
publicity by prohibiting:
extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which
divulged prejudicial matters, such as the refusal of Sheppard to submit to in-
terrogation or take any lie detector tests; any statement made by Sheppard to
officials; the identity of prospective witnesses or their probable testimony; any
belief in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the
case.
Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 361; see Whitebread, supra, at 197. As noted by Whitebread. in Mu 'Afin
a Virginia, the United States Supreme Court -addressed whether a defendant has a consti-
tutional right to ask content questions during voir dire." Whitebread, supra, at 198; see 500
U.S. 415,424-26 (1991). According to Whitebread, the Court held that:
the Sixth Amendment does not require a judge in a well-publicized case to
inquire about the amount and content of the media reports that each poten-
tial juror may have observed. Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge ask po-
tential jurors whether they have formed an opinion because of the reports
from outside sources. Unless the adverse publicity and media justify a pre-
sumption of prejudice, the juror's declaration of impartiality may be believed.
Whitebread, supra, at 198; see	 500 U.S. at 424-26.
155
 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1620.
156 See id.
157 See id.
156 See id.
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discussing any aspect of the case with the media. 159 Also, a gag order
would not violate freedom of the press because courts have not inter-
preted the First Amendment to grant the press a right of free access
to trial participants. 16° If the press publishes prejudicial stories, a trial
court then can warn those reporters who wrote or broadcasted those
stories of "the impropriety of publishing material not introduced in
the proceedings."m
2. Voir Dire
Once a trial court has imposed a gag order on trial participants,
Whitebread and Contreras assert that the trial court would then con-
duct voir dire—the second and final element of the Sheppard-Mu Min
rentecly. 162 Whitebread and Contreras stress that a completely un-
tainted jury is not constitutionally required and thus should not be a
court's goal. 163 Due to the publicity surrounding a high-profile case,
there are few people who have no knowledge of, or have yet to form
an opinion about, the case. 164 Therefore, the Mu Mitt voir dire stan-
dards seek jurors who could render an impartial verdict despite in-
formation obtained from the media, 165 These standards speed up the
voir dire process because they eliminate the need to tirelessly question
potential jurors about their exposure to pretrial publicity. 166 Accord-
ing to Whitebread and Contreras, even the most extensive voir dire
could not uncover all of the hidden biases found in potential ju-
rors. 167 Instead of conducting a voir dire in the hopes of accomplish-
ing the impossible, they suggest that society should trust that jurors
will respond truthfully to the questions asked during voir dire and
remain true to their oath of rendering a fair verdict based on the evi-
dence presented at trial)"
Whitebread and Contreras also contend that the Mu Min stan-
dards of voir dire would eliminate the need to sequester the jttry. 169
They argue that society should not concern itself with media reports
199 Sec id.
160 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1621.
161 Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 362; see Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1621.
162 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14,1622.
169 See id.
See id.
169 See id.
Iso
167 Sec Wh iiebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1622-23.
166 Id. at 1623.
169 Id.
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jurors may hear if the judge allows them to return to their homes at.
the end of the court day.'" Judges should caution the jury, however,
that any information they hear outside of the courtroom may indeed
be wrong and is not part of the official trial proceedings."' Moreover,
judges should further remind jurors of their oath to render a verdict
based only on the evidence presented in court.'" Society should then
trust jurors to uphold their oath.'" Whitebread and Contreras believe
that trust, as an alternative to sequestration, would not only increase
the pool of potential jurors because sequestration would no longer
exist, but also would eliminate the severe social burdens imposed on a
sequestered jury in a high-profile case.'"
Whitebread and Contreras present a few remedies that should
abate attempts by the media to pressure jurors in high-profile cases.'"
First, a trial court may issue a protective order establishing a buffer
zone around a juror's house.'" Buffer zones have been upheld as
constitutional, and they provide a sufficient shield between the jurors
and the potential harassers. 177 Second, many states have jury tamper-
ing laws that prohibit people from corruptly attempting to influence
juror decisions.'" They stress, however, that this remedy should be
coupled with professional restraint exercised by the media.'" White-
bread and Contreras suggest that the press should direct some effort.
toward protecting the rights of a defendant to a fair trial by unbiased
jurors. 18°
III. PARTY ANONYMITY IN CIVIL TRIALS
The two proposals outlined in Section II are aimed at protecting
a high-profile defendant's right to a fair trial in a media-dominated
17° Id.
171 Id.
172 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1623.
173 Id.
174 Id.
173
 See id. at 1624.
178 Id.
177 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1624. In 1994, the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a court-ordered buffer zone prohibiting protestors from picketing,
patrolling, congregating, approaching, or demonstrating within 300 feet of a women's
health center. See Madsen v. Women's Health Cir., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 759, 776 (1994).
175
 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, al 1624. According to Whitebread and
Contreras, California is an example of a state that has a statute prohibiting people from
attempting to influence a juror's decision. Id. at n.219.
og Id. at 1624.
18° Id.
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atmosphere."' Robinson's proposal involves the establishment of
high-profile courts, whereas Whitebread and Contreras' proposal in-
volves the utilization of gag orders and a specialized type of voir
dire. 1 S2 Both proposals go beyond the remedies courts already use to
protect the fairness of high-profile trials; 183 nevertheless, other new
solutions are needed to adequately defend the rights of the accused.
The solution this Note advocates includes permitting high-profile
criminal defendants to proceed anonymously throughout their court
proceedings. 184 Although anonymity for defendants in criminal pro-
ceedings is a rather novel idea, courts have allowed plaintiffs in civil
trials to proceed anonymously in certain circumstances for more than
two decades."5
In civil trials, a plaintiff may keep his identity anonymous
throughout the trial despite the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that
requires a plaintiff to disclose his or her name in the instrument
commencing a lawsuit."8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) re-
quires a complaint. to "include the names of all the parties." 187 This
requirement of disclosure "protects the public's legitimate interest in
knowing all of the facts involved" in the case. 188 Public access to this
information is more than a customary procedural formality; First
Amendment guarantees are implicated when a court decides to re-
strict public scrutiny of judicial proceedings."8 Nevertheless, courts
will allow plaintiffs to depart from this "procedural custom fraught
with constitutional overtones" to accommodate a plaintiff's asserted
need (o proceed anonymously, 181
The majority of cases appellate courts have examined regarding
party anonymity have historically involved cases where personal pri-
181 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1339; Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at
1588-89.
182 Sec supra notes 126-180 and accompanying text,
183 See supra notes 126-180 and accompanying text.
184 See infra notes 301-368 and accompanying text.
188 See. e.g.. Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 684-85 (11th Cir,
2001); Doe V, Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981); S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women
Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1979).
186 FEn, R, CB% P. 10(a); see Aware, 253 F.3d at 684,
187 FED. R. Civ, P. 10(a),
188 Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992).
189 Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980); Stegall. 653
F.2d at 185.
m Stegall, 653 F.2t1 at 185.
181 See Mum, 253 F.3d at 684-85.
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vac), issues are the chief concerns. 192
 In fact, a number of decisions
have pointed to abortions as the "paradigmatic example of the type of
highly sensitive and personal matter that warrants a grant of anonym-
ity."195
 In addition to abortion cases, courts have allowed party ano-
nymity in non-abortion related lawsuits as well.'94
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, in Roe v. Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc., in 2001, "parties
to a lawsuit must identify themselves in their respective pleadings."' 95
Nevertheless, in 1981, in Doe, v. Stegall, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit stated that "the public right to scrutinize
governmental functioning is not so completely impaired by a grant of
anonymity to a party as it is by closure of the trial hself." 196 In Stegall,
the plaintiffs (a mother who brought the suit on behalf of her two
minor children) sought to enjoin routine daily religious observances
in the county's public schools.' 97 There, "{flearing harassment and
violence directed against the Doe family generally and the Doe chil-
dren in particular should their names be publicly disclosed, the plain-
tiffs asked that they be permitted to proceed under fictitious
names."198 The court found that "party anonymity does not obstruct
the public's view of the issues" involved in a lawsuit or the court's pro-
cess of resolving the dispute. 199 Moreover, the court stated that the
fairness open proceedings protect is not lost when one party is in-
volved in the lawsuit under a fictitious name. 2°0
192
 See, e.g., Aware, 253 F.3d at 680-85 (attempting to proceed anonymously in lawsuit
where woman alleged injury during course of abortion); Stegall, 653 F.2d at 181-82, 186.
193 Aware, 253 F.3d at 685.
14 See, c.g.,James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that identifi-
cation of parties by their real names in case where plaintiffs children would be affected
should yield in deference to sufficiently pressing needs for party anonymity); Stegall, 653
F.2d at 186 (allowing anonymity in suit fled on behalf of minors which involved plaintiff's
objection to school prayer); see generally Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Stipp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980)
(allowing plaintiff to proceed anonymously to protect his transsexuality due to social
stigma involved in that area); Doe v. Gillman, 347 F. Stipp. 482 (N.D. Iowa 1972) (allowing
anonymity in suit challenging state welfare regulations conditioning AFDC assistance on
recipients' cooperation with prosecutions of spouses for nonsupport); Doe v. Shapiro, 302
F. Stipp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969). appeal dismissed on other grounds, 396 U.S. 488 (1970) (allow-
ing anonymity in suit challenging state welfare regulations conditioning assistance pay-
ments to illegitimate children on recipient-mother's disclosure of father's identity).
195
 Aware, 253 F.3d at 684.
196 653 F.2d at 185.
197 Id. at 181-82.
198 Id. at 182.
'" Id. at 185.
200 Id.
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Despite the constitutional importance of openness of judicial
proceedings, courts have established exceptions to the rule of disclo-
sure to allow a plaintiff to a lawsuit to proceed anonymously. 201 To de-
cide whether to allow a party to proceed anonymously, courts must
determine whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right that
outweighs the constitutional presumption of openness of judicial pro-
ceedings.= In balancing privacy concerns with the presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings, courts give considerable weight. to
certain factors common to anonymous party suits.= These factors
include the following: (1) plaintiffs challenging 'governmental activity;
(2) plaintiffs required to disclose information of the utmost intimacy;
and (3) plaintiffs compelled to admit their intention to engage in il-
legal conduct, thereby risking criminal prosecution. 2" The Fifth Cir-
cuit in Stegall stated that the enumerated factors are not a "rigid,
three-step test for the propriety of party anonymity," nor is one factor
meant to be dispositive. 205 Along with these specific factors, threats of
violence generated by a case, the threat of hostile public reaction to a
lawsuit, and the special status and vulnerability of the plaintiffs, when
looked at in conjunction with the other three factors, can sometimes
"tip the balance against the customary practice of judicial open-
ness."206 Underlying all three of the involved factors is whether a
"plaintiff would be likely to stiffer real and serious harm if she was not
allowed to use a psettdonym."2"
Because anonymity is still the exception, the possibility of embar-
rassment resulting from being a named party to a lawsuit, standing
alone, will not. permit a party to proceed anonymously= Further-
more, the fact that a suit may "annoy the parties and subject them to
possible criticism" is not enough to deprive the judge, the jury, and
the public of the right to know the identity of the parties.= Overall,
trial judges must carefully review all circumstances of a case in deter-
201 See Aware, 253 F.3d at 685; Frank, 951 F.2d at 323.
202
 Frank, 951 F.2d at 323 (quoting Stegal4 653 F.2d at 186).
222 Id.; see Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185-86.
204 See Frank, 951 F.2d at 323; Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185-86.
2°5 Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185.
200
 Id. at 186. The Fifth Circuit allowed parties to proceed anonymously because the
plaintiffs were children, the plaintiffs made a showing of threatened harm, the plaintiffs
pointed to potential serious social ostracization based upon militant religious attitudes,
and the case involved the fundamental privateness of religious beliefs. Id.
207 Victoria v. Larpenter, No. 00-T41960. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5072, at *5-6 (E.D. La.
Apr. 17, 2001).
"8 Frank, 951 F.2d at 324; Victoria, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5072, at *6.
200 Stegall, 653 F.2d at 184.
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mining whether a plaintiff's privacy concerns outweigh the general
presumption of openness of judicial proceedings. 21 °
IV. INEFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT DEVICES COURTS UTILIZE TO
REMEDY THE EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL PUBLICITY ON
HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL CASES
A. Gag Orders
A gag order on trial participants, standing alone, will not ade-
quately protect a high-profile criminal defendant's right to a fair
tria1. 2 " Issuing gag orders without utilizing other devices is problem-
atic because gag orders cannot constitutionally restrict the media's
ability to report everything it learns or gathers about the case before
or during the tria1. 212 In addition, although gag orders restrict the
trial participants' ability to talk about the case and thus limit the me-
dia's information sources, 2" they are ineffective when utilized by
themselves because they do not limit the underlying information to
which the press has easy access. 214 For example, gag orders do not re-
strict the identity of the accused; thus, even with a gag order, the press
can conceivably learn of the defendant's identity and then report in-
formation about the defendant's role in the crime before the trial be-
gins. 215
When employed along with other effective remedies, however, a
gag order can effectively decrease the amount of prejudicial pretrial
publicity that reaches potential jurors. 216 A gag order does not violate
freedom of the press because courts have not construed the First
Amendment as granting the press a right of free access to trial par-
ticipants. 217 If reporters publish prejudicial stories about a case, a trial
21° See Frank, 951 F.2d at 323; Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185-86; S. Methodist, 599 F.2d at 712—
13.
211 Gag orders have been issued in several high-profile cases in recent years, including
Simpson's civil trial, the Timothy McVeigh case, the Paula Jones sexual harassment
case against President Clinton, and a class-action lawsuit against tobacco companies in
Florida. Breton, supra note 44 at IA. Despite these gag orders, almost everyone in the
country knew about those cases because the press was still able to report everything they
learned about the defendants before the respective trials began. See id.
212 See Whitebreati & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1607.
213 See Stephen, supra note 29, at 1084-85.
214 See id.
213 SeeWhitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1607-08.
216 See Stephen, supra note 29, at 1084,
214 See In re Application of Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 608 (2nd Cir.
1988). To date, only the Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have upheld gag or-
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court can notify them of the impropriety of publishing material not
introduced in the proceedingots
Overall, a Irlestraint on, trial participant speech is effective be-
cause, although not directly restraining the media, it severely limits
their information sources." 2 " With gag orders, "the judge can control
the release of information to the press by police officers, witnesses,
and the counsel for both sides. "220 Gag orders can decrease the
amount of prejudicial pretrial publicity because the judge can order
trial participants not to discuss such topics as the refusal of a defen-
dant to submit to a lie detector test; the identity of prospective wit-
nesses or their likely testimony; and any belief in the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, 221
B. Ufir Dire
Despite the noble goals of voir dire, it generally is not an effective
way of protecting a high-profile criminal defendant from damaging
pretrial publicity.222 voir dire, as it is currently used, tries to eliminate
the impact of pretrial publicity by selecting jurors who have no knowl-
edge about the case. 223 It is virtually impossible in a high-profile case
to find a juror with no knowledge about the case, considering the
large amount of pretrial publicity.224 In fact, jurors in high-profile
ders as constitutional. lThitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1609. Those that have
upheld gag orders on the trial participants have applied the less restrictive "reasonable
likelihood" standard that requires only that the court evaluate whether it is -reasonably
likely that the pretrial publicity will prejudice a fair trial.' Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 610; see
Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 160911.141.
218 CAMPBELL, SUP/ note 109, at 131; see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 360, 361
(1966).
219 Stephen. supra note 29, at 1084.
22° CAmPaw,. supra note 109, at 131.
221 Breton, supra note 44, at 1A. In the federal corruption case involving Mayor Cianci
mentioned above, the gag order issued prohibited everyone with a connection to the case
from talking about:
the character, credibility, reputation, alleged prior bad acts or criminal record
of a party or witness;' the possibility of a guilty plea or any statement given by
a defendant; the existence or results . „ of a lie-detector test given to a de-
fendant; the identity, anticipated testimony or credibility of any prospective
witnesses; any information given to the grand jury; and the contents of any
documents filed under seal or sealed by the court or information about
chambers conferences.
Id.
222 See Wh itebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1610-11.
223 Id. at 1610,
224 Id, at 1611.
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cases not impacted by pretrial news reports may be "so far removed
from the mainstream of American life" that the community views will
not be expressed in the courtroom. 225
 Voir dire may also locate poten-
tial jurors who have not yet formed an opinion about the case. 22° Un-
fortunately, locating jurors who have not formed an opinion about a
case that they have learned about through the press is difficult to
achieve in a high-profile case because people naturally respond to
events they see unfolding in the news. 227
 Moreover, by solely attempt-
ing to determine a juror's exposure to the media, voir dire fails to de-
termine the actual existence and degree of any bias engendered by
such exposure. 228
 An extensive voir dire also typically involves substan-
tial financial costs and thus has the result of burdening taxpayers. 229
Although the goal of voir dire is to excuse tainted jurors, the pos-
sibility exists that some potential jurors will not admit their preju-
dice. 239
 Indeed, during a voir dire examination, jurors sometimes do
not give accurate or honest responses. 231
 Chief justice Marshall
pointed out that a juror possessing a fixed opinion about the guilt of a
defendant might claim to be able to render an impartial verdict, and
indeed might be able to, but the law should not rely on those
claims.232
 Because jurors who claim in their voir dire examination that
223 Id.
226 Sec id.
227 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1611.
228
 Stephen, supra note 29, at 1070 n.49; see also Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, 1110
Is an ImpaHialjuror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 Am. U. L. REV. 631, 649-54 (1991).
229
 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1338. Justice Reardon commented that a reading of
the fair trial cases does not provide an adequate description of the endless days spent on
voir dire at great private and public expense prior to the commencement of trial where
everyone in attendance is wrung dry in interrogations based on possible juror preju-
dice emanating from dangerous publicity." Paul C. Reardon, The Fair Trial-Free Press Contro-
versy—Where We Have Been and Where We Should Be Going, 4 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255. 264
(1967).
23°
 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1610.
"1 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1335. "Dale W. Broeder, a staff member of the University
of Chicago jury Project, casts some doubts on the efficacy of voir dire. He conducted in-
terviews with 223 jurors and most of the lawyers involved in 23 consecutive trials before a
federal district court in the Midwest." Walter Wilcox, The jury Trial, in FREE PRESS AND FAIR
TRIAL: SOME DIMENSIONS OF ME PKOHLEM 77, 88 (Chilton R. Bush ed., 1970). From these
interviews, Broeder set out the following points as evident: "(1) Voir dire is grossly ineffec-
tive as a screening mechanism ... ; (3) Jurors often, either consciously or unconsciously,
lie on voir land] (4) Voir dire is utilized much more effectively as a forum for indoctri-
nation than as a means of sifting out potentially unfavorable jurors." Id. Walter Wilcox
states that these results are persuasive and that perhaps it is 'naive to assume that [voir
dire' serves to cleanse the mind of the facts or that it can eliminate prejudiced jurors." Id.
292
	 supra note 31, at 42. In Irvin v. Dowd, despite extensive voir dire, the force
of the continued adverse pretrial publicity about the defendant prejudiced almost every
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they can render an impartial verdict most likely will not be able to do
so after having already formed an opinion about a high-profile case,
an extensive voir dire examination, by itself, will not always result in
an impartial jury. 235
C. jury Instructions
Special jury instructions are ineffective at decreasing the prejudi-
cial effect of pretrial publicity because "it is impractical to believe that.
jurors disregard information that may be deeply imbedded in their
minds."234 In addition, jury instructions in high-profile criminal cases
often do not serve to compel jurors to disregard an individual's celeb-
rity status because it is extremely difficult for jurors to think of a ce-
lebrity as a regular person. 255
In a survey of approximately 500 judges, only 32.9 percent be-
lieved that jury instructions were "highly effective" in ensuring impar-
tiality in the jury's decision-making process. 235 On the other hand,
40.5 percent found jury instructions to be "moderately effective" and
potential juror in the county where the trial was going to be held. 366 U.S. 717, 726
(1961). Of the jurors finally impaneled, eight of the twelve had already formed an opinion
that the defendant was guilty. Id. at 727. From this statistic Justice Clark concluded:
With such an opinion permeating their minds. it would be difficult to say that
each could exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliberations. The in-
fluence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent that it uncon-
sciously fights detachment from the mental processes of the average man....
[Wle can only say that in the light of the circumstances here the finding of
impartiality does not meet constitutional standards.
Id. at 727-2B. Clark continued, "No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he
would be fair and impartial," but he notes. "Iwiliere so many, so many times, admitted
prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little weight." Id. at 728. The /rvitt
Court suggested that prolonged and extensive pretrial publicity may constitute evidence
that the judgment of the jury panel has been so adversely impacted to the point that the
credibility of all potential jurors' truthful assertions of impartiality is undermined. OAP-
LIA„ supra note 109, at 100.
233 See BUNKER ., supra note 31, at 42,
234 Robinson, supra note 3, at 1336.
235 Sec id. at 1336 n.169. Robinson points out that in the 1997 Bill Cosby extortion trial,
in which Autumn Jackson was the defendant, the judge read to the jury ninety minutes'
worth of jury instructions. Id. The judge basically told the jury that it makes no difference
whether the defendant was television icon Bill Cosby's daughter. Id. Robinson contends
that the jurors in the Cosby case could not possibly disregard the defendant's father'• ce-
lebrity status or the pretrial publicity surrounding the case just because the judge told
them to do so in the jury instructions. Id.
2" Fred S. Siebert, Trial Judges' Opinions on Prejudicial Publicity, in FREE PRESS AND FAIR
TRIAL: SOME DIMENSIONS OF '111E PROBLEM 1, 12 (Chilton R. Bush ed., 1970).
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13.2 percent found them to be "ineffective." 237 From this data, one
commentator suggests that "[a]pparently some judges are not sure
that their instructions not to read or listen to news reports of the trial
are always followed by members of the jury. "238 In addition, as to the
effects of jury instructions, one judge surveyed commented, "A juror's
mind can no more be cleansed of information than a bell can be un-
r ung."2"
D. Sequestration
Although sequestration seems like an excellent solution to pro-
tect a high-profile criminal defendant's right to a fair trial on its face,
this remedy has many deficiencies. 24° Because of its high social and
financial costs, sequestration is highly impractical in preventing media
publicity from adversely affecting the required impartiality of the jury
in a high-profile case. 241 Indeed, sequestering a jury is ineffective at
minimizing the effects of excessive media coverage on a high-profile
criminal trial because sequestration conies too late in the process, 242
By the time jurors are impaneled, most of them have already been
swayed by pretrial media reports. 243 Although sequestration protects
the jury from the influence of media reports during the trial, it does
not correct any pretrial prejudice. 244 For example, one commentator
points out that the Juan Corona murder case drew extensive media
attention in the pretrial stage—the media constantly described the
recovery of the bodies in detail, and Corona's guilt had already been
decided in the court of public opinion. 243
Moreover, sequestration is "a major inconvenience for the im-
paneled jurors who may then prejudice the result in the trial by blam-
ing the defendant for this disruption of their lives. "246 Indeed, defen-
dants often do not exhibit characteristics that "make them seem
worthy of a citizen's sacrifice" of sequestration. 247 In fact, sequestra-
tion is so unpopular with jurors that courts often withhold from jurors
237 Id.
233 Id.
299 Id.
240 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1338.
241 See id.
242 See id. at 1336.
243 See id.
244 Sec Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1612.
243 GERALD, supra note 95, at 80.
246 KANE, supra note 7, at 65.
247 GERALD, supra note 95, at 81.
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the identity of attorneys who move for it. 248 The large amount of secu-
rity measures imposed on jurors also creates resentment among
them.249
In addition, the financial costs of sequestering a jury are an
enormous burden on the tax-paying conununity because high-profile
trials typically continue for long periods of time. 25° When a jury is se-
questered, the monetary costs include room, board, and entertain-
ment of the jurors; in a lengthy trial, these costs can he enormous. 251
In regard to the social costs, sequestration may decrease the number
of people willing to serve on juries because people do not want to be
separated from their families and friends for any considerable
amount of time.252 Furthermore, a lengthy sequestration may de-
crease the chances for a fair trial because jurors may rush through
their deliberations to return to their everyday HATO" Sequestration
also means that persons of "professional status or business responsibil-
ity usually cannot give time to jury duty."254 Because the benefits of
sequestration are often heavily outweighed by the fiscal and social
burdens associated with it, it is not an effective or efficient remedy
available to courts. 255
E. Postponement
Despite its attractiveness as a remedy, postponement does not
effectively diminish the effects of pretrial publicity on a high-profile
criminal case. 25° Potential jurors are not likely to forget everything
they heard in the news before the original trial date merely because
245 1d.
249 1d.
259 See M.; Robinson, supra note 3, at 1338. At the close of a high-profile case, taxpayers
can expect to pay thousands, or even millions of dollars. Robinson points out that Mike
Tyson's rape trial cost Indiana taxpayers approximately $100,000. and 0j. Simpson's
criminal trial cost California taxpayers about $9 million. Robinson, supra note 3, at 1338.
291
 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1612. Indeed, iu Sheppard, justice Clark
thought that ordering the jurors to avoid all contact with news media reports would have
been a less drastic step than sequestration. KANE, supra note 7, at 21.
252 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1613.
255 See id.
254 GERA-Ln supra note 95, at 81.
255 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1615.
256 See id. at 1618. In a survey of approximately 400 judges, 12.2 percent found post-
ponement to be "highly effective," 30.4 percent found it to be "moderately effective," and
9.3 percent found it to be "ineffective." Siebert, supra note 236, at 13.
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the trial is moved to a future time. 257 Postponement is also ineffective
because no guarantee exists that media interest in the case will fade
over time.258
 Even if media attention does fade, it may resurge once
the trial eventually takes place. 259
 Postponement may also diminish
the accuracy and reliability of a witness's testimony because a person's
memory often fades over time. 26° In addition, postponement inevita-
bly results in a backlog of the docket in the case's jurisdiction. 281
Postponement of a trial may also negatively impact a high-profile
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. 282
 In 1968, shortly after the
Sheppard case, the Committee on the Operation of the Jury Systemin
the United States Judicial Conference, composed of federal judges,
issued a report stating that federal courts should make more use of
the traditional methods of ensuring an impartial jury. 253
 Although the
committee advocated the use of postponement, it noted that post-
ponement often involves substantial complications, namely "prejudice
to the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and the interest of the
public in the prompt administration of justice."'" Because of its ad-
verse effects on the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a speedy trial,
judge Eric Younger asserts:
[C]ontinuances ... [are] probably the most universally
agreed-upon villain of the court administrative process, and
one which, especially without the consent of the defendant,
is expressly forbidden by statute in many states and, now in
the federal system as well. The last measure which a legal sys-
tem conscious of its image needs is to attempt to create fair-
257 See Whitebread & COntreras, supra note 14, at 1618. Whitebread and Contreras also
point out that psychologists are skeptical that time erodes the harmful effects of pretrial
publicity. Id.
258
 See id.
259 Id. Whitebread and Contreras state that the O.J. Simpson case demonstrates that a
delay in proceedings in a case with national attention will not decrease the interest in the
case. Id. In October of 1995, the Simpson case was the top news story, receiving about
twenty-six hours of coverage on the evening news. Id. at 1619.
288 Id. at 1618.
281 Id. at 1619. Whitebread and Contreras argue that in jurisdictions such as Los Ange-
les, where most high-profile cases arguably take place, any additional backlog to an already
crowded court system could prove disastrous. Id.
262 Sec BUNKER, supra note 31, at 63.
265 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 17, at 412; see BUNKER,
supra note 31, at 62.
264
 Report of the Judicial Conference Committee, supra note 17, at 413; see BUNKER,
supra note 31, at 63.
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ness in its most celebrated cases by keeping them around for
long periods of time. 265
Whitebread and Contreras point out that the United States Supreme
Court has not yet addressed whether postponement of a trial violates
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy tria1. 266 Further,
Whitebread and Contreras state that if a defendant moves for and is
granted a continuance, it would seem unconscionable to permit the
defendant to later succeed on a claim that the continuance violated
his or her right to a speedy tria1. 267 Without a clear statement from the
Court, a defendant's request for a continuance may act as a waiver of
the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial . 268
F. Change of Ventre
Although moving a trial to a place where the publicity is not as
great seems like an ideal way to impanel jurors that lack exposure to
prejudicial pretrial publicity, the value of a venue change as a remedy
has diminished due to technological advances. 269 Because the trial is
moved to a venue outside of the scope of publicity to locate unbiased
jurors, this option is only available if the impact of a case is confined
to a local area. 270 Nonetheless, the current ability of the media to in-
stantaneously reach a vast number of people with one telecast has de-
creased the chances of finding unbiased jurors in any alternate lo-
cale. 2" In high-profile cases, this problem is exacerbated because
265 Eric E. Younger, The "Sheppard" Mandate Today: A Trial judges Perspective, 56 NE 13, L.
REV, 1, 9 (1977).
266 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1606.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 1615.
27° Id. Even if other localities are available for a venue change, lawyers usually do not
want a venue change. Gabrielle Crist, Opal News May Make fury Selection Difficult, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 11, 2000, at 1. Fort Worth Star-Telegram Staff Writer Gabrielle
Crist writes, "There are three words that most attorneys hate: change of venue." Id. In a
Texas criminal case where the defendant Was accused of the abduction of a six-year-old girl
near her home, the media coverage surrounding the case was rather extensive. Id. There,
one of the prosecutors in the case said that he did not want to ask for a venue change be-
cause he wanted the trial to take place where the girl was kidnapped. Id. Only if it became
too obvious that too many of the potential jurors already formed an opinion about the
guilt of the accused would the prosecution even consider a venue change. Id.
271 Siebert, supra note 236, at 10; Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1615. In a
survey of approximately 400 judges, only 12.2 percent fOund a change of venue to be a
highly effective remedy. Siebert. supra note 236, at 10. From this data, a number of judges
concluded that a change of venue was not a complete answer to the situation in which a
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those types of cases often receive nationwide media attention. 272 In-
deed, in particularly notorious cases, a venue change may be of little
help because of inflamed passions surrounding the case: anything less
than an indefinite delay may be inadequate.275 In those situations,
pretrial publicity will eventually reach potential jurors in every loca-
tion suitable for a venue change. 274
Moreover, venue changes in federal court cases are extremely
costly and highly inefficient. 275
 Under a 1990 federal victim's rights
law, the Justice Department must accommodate the needs of victims,
including transportation, housing, and food throughout the course of
the trial, thus making sequestration fiscally burdensome on the tax-
payers.276
 Indeed, many judges resist venue changes because of the
expense.277
 Judges also oppose venue changes because moving the
trial to another location moves the expense of the trial to the host lo-
cation. 278
V. EVALUATION OF NEW PROPOSALS BY SCHOLARS TO REMEDY THE
PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF INTENSE MEDIA COVERAGE
IN HIGH-PROFILE CASES
As Section IV demonstrates, traditional methods to prevent pre-
trial publicity from interfering with the defendant's right to a fair trial
defendant has been given a high degree of publicity. Id. Siebert also asserts that the fact
that most mass media communications today tend to saturate an entire state most likely
influenced the judges' opinions about venue changes. Id.
272 See Whitebread & Contreras. supra note 14, at 1615. Whitebread and Contreras
point out that in the Rodney King trial, the trial judge changed the venue to Simi Valley,
some thirty miles away from Los Angeles, where the beating occurred. Id. In that case,
media attention was nationwide, so the likelihood of impaneling an impartial jury tinder
those circumstances in any jurisdiction in the country was doubtful. Id. In addition, a
venue change to a place only thirty miles away cost the county over $200,000. Id.
278 KANE, supra note 7, at 4. Peter Kane states that a good example of this is the John
Hinckley, Jr. trial for shooting Ronald Reagan. Id. An assassination attempt on the Presi-
dent of the United States is a notorious act that is sure to receive the widest publicity. Id.
Because the shooting was caught on videotape, those scenes were shown over and over
again in slow motion in virtually every television outlet in the country, M. Kane asserts that
it would be impossible to select twelve impartial jurors who had not seen the attack on
television. Id.
274 See id.; Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14. at 1615.
278 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1617.
276 See id .
277 GERALD, supra note 95, at 76.
278 Id. For example, the trial of Joseph Remiro for the murder of the Oakland superin-
tendent of schools cost Contra Costa County, the location to which the trial was moved,
about $500,000. Id. In fact, at least seventeen states restrict venue changes in part because
of the expense to the host county. Id. at 77.
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are ineffective. 279
 Although scholars have suggested alternatives to the
traditional methods, those alternatives also fail to effectively address
the fairness concerns at issue here. 28° As mentioned above, Robinson
asserts that the creation of high-profile courts would help to correct
the problems of excessive media coverage in high-profile cases. 281 In
evaluating the effectiveness of the establishment of high-profile courts
in the future, the practical ramifications of actually implementing
Robinson's remedy are of the utmost concern.
Robinson's proposal, if implemented, would result in several ma-
jor problems. First, the creation of another court system and the train-
ing of judges would place financial burdens on both taxpayers and
states. 282 Training judges in the area of high-profile cases would also
involve substantial monetary costs. 288 Second, Robinson's solution
does not provide for a defendant to have a jury trial because, if a de-
fendant chooses to have his case heard in a high-profile court, the
case would be adjudicated by a specially trained judge rather than by
a jury. 284 Hence, if a defendant wanted to have his case heard by a
jury, then he would have go to a regular court and face fairness prob-
lems.288
 Another problem with her solution is that if judges must have
experience in high-profile cases to receive an appointment to a high-
profile court, it soon would be impossible to choose judges with high-
profile experience to sit on the court if no one outside the high-
profile system hears high-profile cases. 288
 Thus, at some future time,
inexperienced judges would have to hear high-profile cases, which is
exactly the problem Robinson wants to avoid by establishing these
specialized courts. 287 Yet another problem with Robinson's proposal is
that it would be financially and temporally difficult to set up a process
whereby someone determines which cases should be classified as
"high-profile" and thus be eligible' for adjudication in a high-profile
court. 288
 Most importantly, Robinson's solution is not very helpful be-
279 See supra notes 211-278 and accompanying text.
288 See infra notes 281-300 and accompanying text.
281 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1339,1340.
282 Sec id.
283 See id. at 1340,1342-43.
284 See id. at 1344,1345.
288 See id. at 1348.
288 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1340,
287 Sec id.
288 See id. at 1339.
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cause it does not attempt to correct the problems inherent in the pre-
sent court system: it merely attempts to ignore them. 289
As stated previously, Whitebread and Contreras argue that the
Sheppard-MuMin remedy strikes a proper balance between the defen-
dant's interest in a fair trial and the media's interest in informing the
public. 29° Under the remedy, trial courts impose a gag order on trial
participants and conduct voir dire according to the standards set in
MuMin v. Virgin ia. 291 Whitebread and Contreras' proposed solution
has the potential to effectively curb prejudicial publicity from interfer-
ing with a high-profile defendant's right to a fair trial. 292 With the
Sheppard-MuMin remedy, Whitebread and Contreras acknowledge the
impossibility of impaneling a perfect jury and attempt to decrease the
harm associated with potential jurors' exposure to prejudicial public-
ity.298
 Unlike Robinson, Whitebread and Contreras suggest a remedy
that not only keeps high-profile cases in the current criminal justice
system but also eliminates the old remedies that have proven to be
both ineffective and expensive. 294
Although the Sheppard-Mu Min solution has the potential for suc-
cess, that remedy standing alone most likely will not adequately pro-
tect a high-profile criminal defendant's right to a fair trial because
pretrial publicity will inevitably still negatively influence some impan-
eled jurors despite gag orders on trial participants and the MuMin
voir dire. 295
 First, gag orders are ineffective at preventing pretrial pub-
licity from reaching potential jurors because, although they do limit
some of the media's information sources (namely, what trial partici-
pants tell the media), gag orders do not restrict any of the underlying
information available to the press. 298 Most importantly, gag orders are
problematic because they do not, by themselves, keep the identity of
the defendant hidden from the public. With the Mu Mite style of voir
dire, too much trust is put into the jury rendering an impartial verdict
despite being exposed to extensive pretrial publicity about the case. 297
Just because jurors swear to decide a case based on the facts in front
of them does not mean that they will automatically cast aside any
289
 See id.
290 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1626.
291 Id. at 1620.
292 See id. at 1621.
298 See id. at 1589.
294 See id. at 1625-26.
298
 Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1625-26.
298 See supra notes 211-215 and accompanying text.
29 See supra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
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opinion they may have formed about the guilt or innocence of the
accused prior to the trial. 298 As Justice Tom Clark stated:
The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so
persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the
mental processes of the average man. .. , No doubt each ju-
ror [is] sincere when he [says] that he [will] be fair and im-
partial ... [but] such a statement of impartiality can be
given little weight. 299
Justice Felix Frankfurter similarly wrote, "How can fallible men and
women reach a disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they
heard in court when, before they entered the jury box, their minds
were saturated by press and radio for months preceding by matter de-
signed to establish the guilt of the accused." 3"
VI, APPLYING PARTY ANONYMITY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS TO PROTECT
THE RIGHTS OF HIGH-PROFILE CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
Although the Sheppard-Mu Min remedy has the potential to pro-
tect effectively a high-profile defendant's rights if applied properly by
trial courts,301 trial judges must. do more than just impose gag orders
and conduct voir dire in a different manner to rectify the pretrial
publicity problem in high-profile criminal trials. The Sheppard-Munn
remedy alone will not correct the enormous impact that prejudicial
pretrial publicity has on jurors in high-profile criminal cases."2 Thus,
courts must take an extra step to ensure that any pretrial news reports
about the case will not negatively influence potential jurors and any
pretrial publicity that has made its way into jurors minds will not im-
pact. their decisioninaking." 3 That necessary extra step involves allow-
ing a high-profile criminal defendant to proceed anonymously
throughout the court proceedings. 804 A high-profile criminal defen-
298 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,727-28 (1961).
299 Id.
500 Id. at 729-30 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
891 See Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1625-26.
302 See id.
898 See Burr kER, supra note 31, at 144.
884 See infra notes 305-368 and accompanying text. Anonymity has been suggested in
criminal rape cases. David Calvert-Smith, Director of Pubic Prosecutions in Great Britain,
backed a reform of the rape trial process to give defendants anonymity. Steve Atkinson,
Chief Backs Rape Case Anonymity, `Dm MIRROR, Jan. 12, 2001, at 2. Smith contends that the
names of those accused of rape and child abuse should be kept secret until a case against
them has been proved. Id. According to Atkinson, "Keeping names secret would protect
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dant could move to proceed anonymously during the preliminary
hearing, the stage when defendants typically request other measures
such as venue changes, prior restraints, and gag orders. 508
 If an appel-
late court finds that a judge incorrectly denied a motion for anonym-
ity, the only way for an appellate court to correct such an error is to
remand the case for a new tria1. 506
One benefit in allowing a high-profile criminal defendant to pro-
ceed anonymously is that anonymity, unlike the gag orders in the
Sheppard -MuMin remedy, can prevent prejudicial pretrial publicity
about the defendant from negatively influencing potential jurors. 307
 If
a judge agrees to conceal the defendant's identity before jury selec-
tion, the negative impact of the media's coverage on potential jurors
will be severely limited because the defendant's name will not be re-
vealed in any court documents or in any public record. 308
 This means
that the press will not have access to the defendant's identity to subse-
quently use in pretrial news reports. 508 Without the ability to report
the high-profile defendant's name in any pretrial news reports, the
potential for media coverage to cause juror bias will decrease because
the jury pool will most likely never learn the defendant's name in
connection with the case before the tria1.80
 In addition, the media
high profile targets such as singer Mick Hucknall and former Southampton football club
manager David Jones." Id.
" See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587-88 (1976) (approving implic-
itly request for prior restraint in preliminary hearing). If appropriate measures are taken
later than this point, the pretrial publicity may be so great that no remedy would make a
difference in the fairness of the trial. For example, in the O.J. Simpson case, up until three
weeks before the trial, a gag order still had not been issued. Judge Ito's plan to impose a
gag order at that time was revealed by the media. See PAUL THALER, THE SPECTACLE: MEDIA
AND THE MAKING OF TIlE O.J. SIMPSON STORY 87-88 (1997). Although Ito did impose a
gag order shortly thereafter, the amount of pretrial publicity was already so great that the
order could not undo the damage that had been done in prejudicing potential jurors. Sec
id.
306
 See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361-63 (1966). The Court stated, la pub-
licity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be or-
dered." Id. at 363. In holding that the trial court did not adequately protect the defen-
dant's right to a fair trial, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the District Court with
instructions to release Sheppard from custody unless the State prosecuted him again
within a reasonable time. Id.
307 See BUNKER, supra note 31, at 144.
s°8 See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981).
8°9 See id.
91 ° See id. Obviously in high-profile cases that are high-profile due to the notoriety of
the crime itself and not necessarily because of the celebrity status of the defendant, the
media could determine the name of the defendant based on the facts of the case, the vic-
tim, the location, and possible suspects. Thus, benefits of anonymity during the pretrial
stage in heinous crimes, in which the press probably does not even care about the name of
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will lack the ability to connect the high-profile defendant to any
prejudicial information in the defendant's background that the press
could have found and reported had the court not permitted the de-
fendant to proceed anonymously."' Eliminating the possibility that
the press will report prejudicial information about a high-profile
criminal defendant's background prior to the trial could significantly
reduce the likelihood of impaneling a jury with preexisting opinions
of the defendant's guilt or innocence. 512 Any reduction of the likeli-
hood of impaneling a biased jury certainly increases the chances that.
a high-profile criminal defendant will receive a fair trial." 3 If, after
anonymity is granted, someone reveals the name of the defendant,
judges have several remedies available to them. If disclosure happens
before or during a trial, a judge could hold the person who revealed
the defendant's identity in contempt of court." 4 If the defendant's
identity is revealed in the courtroom while the jurors are present,
contempt is still an option, but a more appropriate remedy would be
a mistrial, if the judge thought the violation serious enough to nega-
tively impact the accused's right to a fair trial.
the defendant, are speculative at best. Anonymity is therefore at its most effective when a
case is high profile because of the celebrity status of the defendant rather than the heinous
nature of the crime. Some celebrities fall into two or more categories, such as O.J. Situp-
son, because of the heinousness of the crime and because the defendant is well known.
The lines between the categories are not always clear, and defendants will have to decide
for themselves if anonymity would work in their particular circumstances.
311 If the court had permitted the suspect in Mu Min to remain anonymous, the de-
tailed reporting of suspect's background which showed that suspect was fully capable of
committing murder would have been avoided. The reports about suspect's background
included details of the suspect's juvenile record, prior murder of a cab driver, history of
prison problems and parole denials, habit of going on numerous criminal forays before
murdering the victim, and fellow inmates' description of the suspect as a 'lustful" individ-
ual who did "strange stuff." Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415,436-37 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Moreover. had the press in Sheppard not known the defendant's identity, head-
lines that were printed such as "Why Isn't Sam Shepard in Jail?" would have been impossi-
ble to run. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 341. In the Mattson murder case the Los Angeles Times
ran a large-type banner headline that said, "MANSON GUILTY NIXON DECLARES."
KANE, supra note 7, at 30. Potential jurors who read about the President declaring the ac-
cused guilty as charged would most likely have a difficult time forgetting it once the de-
fendant's identity as "Manson" was announced. See id.
312 See generally Mu 'Jilin, 500 U.S. at 443-48 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
313 See generally Whitebread & Contreras, supra note 14, at 1588-89.
314 In the federal corruption case involving Mayor Cianci, United States District Court
Judge Ernest C. Torres said that people caught violating the issued gag order could be
held in contempt of court. Breton, supra note 44, at 1A. Just as contempt is used as a rem-
edy if someone violates a gag order before the trial begins, it can also be used to punish a
violator of an anonymity order. See id.
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Another benefit of allowing a high-profile criminal defendant to
proceed anonymously is that, regardless of how the judge conducts
voir dire, any pretrial publicity that influenced a potential juror prior
to the point where the court grants anonymity will most likely not im-
pact the fairness of the trial. 515
 If a defendant's identity is not revealed
during the trial, a juror is probably not going to remember the de-
fendant's name in connection with negative information reported by
the press just from the facts of the case. 316
 In cases that are high pro-
file due to the defendant's celebrity status, such as the O.J. Simpson
case, allowing the defendant to proceed anonymously, by itself, will
not protect the trial's fairness because concealing a defendant's name
will not conceal a face. 3 " If a juror can recognize the defendant based
on his appearance alone, then any biases he or she may have about
the case will surface because the juror will have the ability to connect
those preexisting biases upon seeing the defendant. 818
 In situations
315 See infra notes 316-320 and accompanying text.
316 1n the murder trial of Diane Zamora, a formal Naval Academy midshipman accused
of abducting and murdering a girl with whom her boyfriend had had an affair, attorneys
worried that publicity would keep them from finding an impartial jury. Crist, supra note
270, at 1. There, 'many of the potential jurors had seen media reports about the case, but
they did not remember the specifics of the case." Id. The assistant district attorney in the
Zamora case stated, "I think they [the potential jurors] hear it, but they don't file it away."
Id.
Some cases are so notorious that the facts alone, not the defendant's identity, is what
prejudices the jury. In those cases, allowing a defendant to proceed anonymously would
not help to deflect any negative information about the case reported by the media prior to
or during the trial. The recent case about the mother who drowned her five children is a
good example—even if Andrea Yates' identity was concealed throughout the trial, the facts
alone would be enough to trigger a juror's memory about information he or she had
heard before or during the trial. See, e.g., CNN, Officer Says Thies Led Him to Her Dead Chil-
dren (Mar. 11, 2002), at Imp://wmv.cnn.com/2002.LAW/02/28/yates.trial/index.html .
Thus, in the Yates trial, anonymity would not be an effective remedy for pretrial publicity.
Sec id.
517 See Ann Burnett, fury Decision-Making Pmcesses in the af Simpson Criminal and Civil
Trials, in THE O.J. SIMPSON TRIALS: RHETORIC, MEDIA, AND TIIE LAW 122, 131 ( Janice
Schuetz & Lin S. Lilley eds., 1999). Burnett states that in the criminal trial some indica-
tion exists that Simpson's celebrity status was difficult for some jurors to get past." Id. In
fact, in a post interview, one juror asked, "How could a man with everything commit mur-
der?" Id.
3111 Sec Ann NI. Gill, Race and Money Mauer: Justice on Trial, in Tit E O. J . SH.tesoN TRIALS:
RHETORIC, MEDIA, AND THE LAW 139, 140 ( Janice Schuetz & Lin S. Lilley eds., 1999). In
the context of the O.J. trial, Gill states "IT] he defendant's celebrity status had a major
influence on the criminal trial. The trial started later than any other activity in the Los
Angeles courthouse because, as Judge Lance Ito noted, 'When O.J. Simpson comes into
the building, everything stops.'" Id. In instances such as the O.J. case, if "everything stops"
when a celebrity walks into the courtroom, it is difficult to see how a juror could stake
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such as those, where a defendant is so recognizable that. anonymity
will not help him or her, the only way for the defendant to be totally
protected is to waive his or her right to be present at the tria1.319 If a
highly recognizable celebrity defendant waives his or her right to be
present at the trial and can proceed anonymously, the jurors will lack
the ability to connect any early prejudicial media reports detailing the
specific defendant's background or declaring the particular defen-
dant's guilt or innocence with the case in front of them. 32°
Although anonymity for high-profile criminal defendants is a new
idea, courts have permitted plaintiffs in civil trials to proceed anony-
mously in certain circumstances for more than two decades. 321 The
ultimate test for allowing a plaintiff in a civil trial to remain anony-
mous involves determining whether the plaintiff has a substantial pri-
vacy right that. outweighs the "'customary and constitutionally em-
bedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. "522
Certainly, a high-profile criminal defendant has an important consti-
tutional right that needs protection by the courts—the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial."' To adequately protect a high-profile
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, courts
should permit a defendant to proceed anonymously throughout the
judicial proceedings. 324
decision based on the evidence presented in the case rather than on the information re-
ported by the media prior.to the trial. See id.
When a criminal defendant receives notice of the date of the trial and nonetheless
fails to appear, it is not sufficient, as a matter of law, for the trial to go on without the de-
fendant's presence. WARREN FREEDMAN, THE CONS'ITIVI1ONAL RIGHT in A SPEEDY AND
FAIR CRIMINAL TRIAL 14 (1989); see People v. Parker, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (N.Y. 1982).
Because the constitutional right of a defendant to be present at his own trial is fundamen-
tal, the validity of a waiver of that right hinges on a showing that the defendant was in-
formed of the nature of the right to be present at trial as well as the consequences of fail-
ing to appear at trial, including the fact that the trial will be held without his presence. Id.
52° Some studies indicate that one person's perception of another is 'heavily condi-
tioned by his attitudinal set (prejudices)." Wilcox, stiptyr note 231, at 74, 89. Upon confron-
tation with a defendant, the defendant's appearance, sex, age, race, and other factors
(possibly recognizing the defendant as a celebrity) have been shown to have a major effect
on the jury's Misting hostility or sympathy towards the defendant. Id. The effect of face-to-
face confrontation can modify the impression of the defendant acquired from pretrial
publicity—this effect is mainly in the affective component of attitude ("Could this [celeb-
rity] possible commit such a crime?"). Id. at 90.
82I See, e.g., Roe V. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 684-85 (11th Cir.
2001); Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185; S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne
& Jaffe, 599 F.2c1 707, 712-13 (5th Cir. 1979).
322 Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320. 323 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186).
3" See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
921 See BUNKER, SUP/II note 31, at 144.
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Although the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the
press is implicated when a court decides to restrict public scrutiny of
judicial proceedings, courts have allowed party anonymity in civil tri-
als despite this constitutional concern. 325
 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated that the "public's right to scru-
tinize public proceedings is not so completely impaired by a grant of
anonymity to a party as it is by closure of the trial itself." 326 The pub-
lic's right to scrutinize public proceedings is not entirely damaged
with party anonymity because it does not obstruct the public's view of
the issues involved in a lawsuit or of the court's process of resolving
the dispute. 327
 In a high-profile criminal case, even if the trial court
allows the concealment of the defendant's identity, the public and the
media can still attend the trial and look at the public record docu-
menting the trial without impediment.328
 Thus, with anonymity, both
regular citizens and the press will have the ability to scrutinize the ju-
dicial proCess involved in the case, which is what the Fifth Circuit has
said the First Amendment protects: 329
In deciding whether to allow a party to proceed anonymously in a
civil trial, courts balance the plaintiffs substantial privacy right with
the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. 330 To determine
whether a plaintiffs privacy right will outweigh the presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings, the court looks at the following
non-dispositive factors in the balancing test: a challenge to govern-
ment activity; disclosure of information of the utmost intimacy; and
the potential for admission of the plaintiffs intention to engage in
illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal conduct."' In addition to
these factors, threats of violence generated by a case, the threat of
hostile public reaction to a lawsuit, and the "special status and vulner-
ability" of the plaintiffs can sometimes "tip the balance against the
customary practice of judicial openness." 332
Without question, high-profile criminal defendants, like plaintiffs
in civil trials, have substantial privacy rights that, at times, should out-
323
 See, e.g., Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185; Victoria v. Larpcn ter, No. 00-T41960, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEX1S 5072, at *4-6 (E.D. La. Apr. 17, 2001).
326 Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185.
327 Sec id.
328 Sec id.
329 Sec id.
33° See Aware, 253 F.3d at 685; Frank, 951 F.2d at 323.
331 See Frank, 951 F.2d at 323; Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185-86.
332
 Stegall. 653 F.2d at 186; see Frank, 951 F.2c1 at 323.
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weigh the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings." 3 In ap-
plying this balancing test. in a high-profile criminal case, if a defen-
dant is not allowed to proceed anonymously, the press will often de-
cide to report background information about the defendant that is
very intimate in nature. 334 For example, reports about a high-profile
criminal defendant's juvenile record, past criminal behavior, sensitive
medical information, or past sexual activity in relation to the case
would certainly result in the disclosure of intimate information that a
defendant would not want revealed to the entire public. 335 Further-
more, it would not be uncommon for the public to have a hostile re-
action to a high-profile criminal case, especially one in which the de-
fendant is accused of a particularly heinous crime. 3" It would also not
be unlikely for a high-profile criminal defendant accused of an egre-
gious crime to be threatened with violence from members of the pub-
lic, outraged by the defendant's alleged criminal behavior."? In addi-
tion, even ilthe high-profile defendant is not accused of an egregious
crime, high-profile criminal defendants, especially celebrities and
professional athletes, are sometimes held to a higher standard of
conduct than average members of the pnblic. 338 Thus, those high-
profile criminal defendants, because of their status as celebrities, have
a vulnerability to aggressive prosecution not shared by non-celebrity
533 See Aware, 253 F.3d at 685; Frank, 951 F.2d at 323; S. Methodist, 599 F.2d at 712-13.
334 See, e.g., Alu'Min, 500 U.S. at 435-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at
340-41.
335 See, e.g., Mu 'Min, 500 U.S. at 435-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Sheppard, 384 U.S. at
340-41.
335 See KAN E, supra note 7, at 63. The trial of Charles Manson attracted public attention
due to the bizarre and gruesome nature of the crimes. Id. Similarly, the multiple murders
in addition to the sexual assault on a minor child in the Kellie case attracted large amounts
of public interest. Id. at 64. In Sheppard, during an inquest held by the coroner in the
school gymnasium. the hostility toward the defendant was so great that when Sheppard's
chief counsel attempted to place some documents in the record, he was forcibly ejected
from the room by the Coroner who received cheers, hugs, and kisses from ladies in the
audience." 384 U.S. at 340.
337 See GERALD, supra note 95, at 66-67. Gerald points out that, in Irvin to. Doted, the de-
fendant:
was accused of six murders and several robberies so violent that the media,
the police, and the populace joined in indignation. Although the community
did not resort to the use of the traditional rope and tree, the spirit of lynch-
ing existed. Other communities experience similar hostility upon occasion
and courts are tested when they insist on providing due process in the pretrial
stage.
Id.
335 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1328.
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criminal defendants. 999
 Taking all of these factors into consideration,
a court could find that a high-profile criminal defendant's privacy
rights, at least in some circumstances, outweigh the presumption of
openness in judicial proceedings and thus allow the defendant to
proceed anonymously throughout the trial. 340
Even if a court does not think that a high-profile criminal defen-
dant has a substantial privacy right that outweighs the common prac-
tice of openness in judicial proceedings, criminal defendants still have
an important Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 34 ' This constitu-
tionally protected right is just as important as any asserted privacy
right. 342
 Courts have protected the high-profile defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial at the detriment of the media's First
Amendment right to freedom of the press in cases where judges have
issued prior restraints on the media's ability to publish certain infor-
mation relating to the case." )
 In 1976, in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
the United States Supreme Court set out a three-part balancing test
for a trial court to use in determining whether a prior restraint is con-
stitutionally permissible in a criminal trial setting: (1) "the nature and
extent of pretrial news coverage;" (2) "whether other measures would
be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity;" and
(3) "how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the
threatened danger."944
 Therefore, in deciding whether to permit a
high-profile criminal defendant to proceed anonymously, a court
must also balance a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
fair trial with the First Amendment presumption of openness of judi-
cial proceedings. 545
 In weighing these competing constitutional inter-
ests, a trial court could use the three factors outlined in the Nebraska
Press Court's three-part balancing test to see which interest should
prevail.946
In applying the three factors outlined in Nebraska Press to a high-
profile criminal case to determine whether to allow a high-profile
criminal defendant to proceed anonymously, the criminal defendant's
right to a fair trial would most likely outweigh the presumption of
339 Id. at 1327-28: seel3urnett, supra note 317, at 130-31.
34° See Aware. 253 F.3d at 685; Frank, 951 F.2d at 323; S. Methodist, 599 F.2d at 712-13.
3" See U.S. Corm% amend VI.
342 Sec Neb. Press, 427 U.S. at 562.
343 Scc id. (noting prior restraint issued in trial court).
344 Id.
345
 Sec id. at 561.
348 Sec id. at 562.
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openness of judicial proceedings, tints permitting anonymity. 347 in
Nebraska Preis, the Court found that the trial judge was "justified in
concluding that there would be intense and pervasive pretrial public-
ity" because coverage of the murders dominated the media immedi-
ately after the crime occurred and because only a couple of days after
the murders, a reporter revealed that the defendant had confessed to
the crime. 348 Similarly, in criminal contexts, anonymity should be al-
lowed because the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage in
high-profile criminal cases is often intense and prejudicial to the de-
fendam. 349 As justice Lewis Powell argued in Nebraska Press, in issuing
a prior restraint, a trial judge must consider the other alternatives
listed in Sheppard that do not threaten First. Amendment rights as se-
verely as do prior resiraints. 35° In high-profile criminal cases, however,
other remedies to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial public-
ity have proven extremely ineffective at protecting a high-profile de-
fendant's right to a fair tria1. 351 Furthermore, the Court in Nebraska
Press did not allow the prior restraint because the defense did not
meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that, without a prior re-
straint, the defendant would not receive a fair trial. 352 In that case, it
was not evident that further publicity, unchecked, would distort the
views of potential jurors so extensively that they could not render an
impartial verdict. 353 In high-profile cases, a court would analyze how
effectively anonymity would operate to prevent unfair pretrial public-
ity from biasing potential jurors. 354 As stated previously, allowing a
high-profile criminal defendant to proceed anonymously would effec-
tively prevent prejudicial media reports about the defendant from
reaching potential jurors.355 Weighing these three factors, a trial judge
could certainly find that the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial prevails over the First Amendment rights of the
press, thus permitting the defendant to proceed anonymously. 3"
Critics of criminal defendant anonymity might say that it would
be an ineffective remedy to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial
347 See id.; Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186.
346 427 U.S. at 562-63.
549 See, e.g., Afu'llIirr, 500 U.S. at 418-19; Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 341.
5" Mb. Press, 427 U.S. at 571 (Powell, J., concurring).
551 Sec supra notes 211-278 and accompanying text.
552 See 427 U.S. at 569.
555 Id.
554 See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text.
555 See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text.
956 See Mb. Press. 427 U.S. at 562.
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because, similar to prior restraints, anonymity is completely at odds
with the presumption of open judicial proceedings. 357 This is so be-
cause the public does not have the ability to learn the defendant's real
identity; thus, the reasons justifying anonymity would never outweigh
the openness presumption.358
 Unlike prior restraints, however, with
high-profile criminal defendant anonymity, the media can still attend
the trial and report on the issues and the case's judicial process. 359
Therefore, even if a high-profile criminal defendant's right to a fair
trial prevails in the balancing test, the openness of judicial proceed-
ings would not be entirely destroyed, 30
 as it would if a court ordered a
prior restraint on the media.381
 Thus, anonymity is an effective rem-
edy because trial courts could permit high-profile defendants to pro-
ceed anonymously without completely invading the public and the
media's rights under the First Amendment. 382
As stated above, anonymity is not a litigation strategy beneficial to
all high-profile defendants, 365 It is a strategy some high-profile defen-
dants in some situations may choose to ask the judge to employ, given
all the options and facts in a case. 364
 The biggest drawback of this
remedy is that some defendants, due to their recognizability based on
appearance, would have to waive the right to be present during the
trial, which could send negative signals to the jury in some circum-
stances. 385
 Another problem with anonymity for a high-profile defen-
dant is anonymity itself: sometimes celebrity status can help high-
profile defendants get special treatment from jurors. 388 A trial judge
has discretion to weigh the factors and decide if the right to a fair trial
is in jeopardy before ordering anonymity; indeed, a judge would not
3'37 Sec id.
365 See id.
36° See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185. Although the press can attend the trial, with my solution,
the defendant's identity will not be revealed to anyone in the courtroom. The high-profile
defendant will be referred to as John or Jane Doe, depending on the defendant's gender.
Unless the defendant is so famous that he is recognized by his appearance alone, this
would prevent the press from learning of the defendant's identity. Nevertheless, if the
defendant is recognizable based on appearance, the only way to keep the press from dis-
covering his or her identity is for the defendant to waive his right to be in the courtroom.
360 Sec Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 604 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185.
56t See Richmond Newspapea, 448 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, j., concurring); Neb. Press. 427
U.S. at 562.
962 See Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185.
363 See supra notes 317-320 and accompanying text.
36+ See supra notes 317-320 and accompanying text.
366 See supra notes 317-320 and accompanying text.
566 See Robinson, supra note 3, at 1330-33.
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utilize a remedy in a case where doing so would not protect the con-
stitutional rights of either side. 567 Despite its drawbacks, anonymity, in
certain circumstances, can help protect a high-profile defendant's
right to a fair tria1. 368
CONCLUSION
Because the prejudicial effects of pretrial publicity on a high-
profile defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial are often
enormous, courts need remedies that strike the proper balance be-
tween a high-profile criminal defendant's right to fair trial and the
media's freedom of press rights under the First Amendment. Over the
years, courts have applied such remedies as venue changes, post-
ponement, voir dire, jury instructions, and sequestration—all of
which are highly ineffective at protecting a defendant's right to a fair
trial. In addition to utilizing Whitebread and Contreras' Sheppard-
Mu 'Mi n remedy, which imposes gag orders on trial participants and
fashions voir dire. after the standards set out in Mu 'Min v. Virginia,
courts should allow high-profile criminal defendants to proceed
anonymously. Anonymity fills the gaps of the Sheppard-Mu'Min remedy
in two ways. First, permitting high-profile criminal defendants to re-
main anonymous during the judicial proceedings prevents the press
from reporting damaging background information about the defen-
dant that could negatively influence potential jurors, because the me-
dia would not know the defendant's true identity. Second, any pretrial
information about a defendant. that does reach potential jurors most.
likely would not have harmful effects on the trial's fairness because
anonymity prevents impaneled jurors from connecting the defendant
with any information about the defendant contained in pretrial news
reports.
Courts have allowed party anonymity in civil trials for over twenty
years to protect the substantial privacy rights of plaintiffs. In addition
to civil plaintiffs, courts should apply anonymity to high-profile crimi-
nal defendants because they have substantial privacy and fairness
rights that similarly need protection during judicial proceedings.
Without high-profile criminal defendant anonymity, the pretrial pub-
licity associated with high-profile cases will continue to influence
negatively potential jurors, thus violating a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to a fair trial. Courts should not tolerate such a constitu-
367 See supra notes 330-362 and accompanying text,
"a See supra notes 301-368 and accompanying text.
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tional violation in a judicial system that requires triers of fact to ren-
der impartial decisions.
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